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We seek to explain why countries have adopted national Old-Age Insurance and Health Insurance
programs.  Theoretical work has posited several factors that could lead to this adoption: the strain from
expanding capitalism; the need for political legitimacy; the desire to transfer to similar people; increased
wealth; and the outcome of leviathan government.  We relate the probability of a country’s creating social
insurance to proxies for each of these theories.  We find weak evidence that the probability of adopting a
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is very strongly related to system adoption.  We conclude that social insurance can be politically expedient
for many different reasons.
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1.  Introduction
The most dramatic change in the public sector in the twentieth century was the birth and
growth of the social-insurance state.  In 1900, two countries (Germany and Austria) had modest
old-age and medical-care programs for the middle class, created up to twenty years before.
Today, old-age programs and universal medical-care programs are the hallmark of developed
countries.  These programs are big and durable, accounting for 10 to 15 percent of GDP.  As
several countries have shown in recent years, changing these programs is politically
problematic.
1  And these major social programs are surrounded by a series of more minor ones,
ranging from insurance for unemployed workers, cash and medical payments for people disabled
at work, and cash payments for those whose earnings are temporarily low.
This twentieth-century experience raises profound questions: why were these social-
insurance programs created?  And why did different countries create different types of system?
We take up these issues in this paper.  There are many economic and political science theories
for the birth of social insurance.  Those we present are thus not of our own creation, but largely
distil other writers￿ suggestions, for example Peacock and Wiseman (1961) on the effect of wars,
Pelzman (1980) on that of income equality, and Flora and Alber (1981) on that of monarchy.
We group theories about social insurance into five categories.  The ravages of capitalism
theory argues that social insurance was born in the brutishness of capitalist life; as economic life
became less stable, social insurance created a needed safety net.  The political legitimacy theory
argues that social insurance was created to legitimize non-elected governments, by giving people2
a stake in the continuation of the state.  Wagner￿s Law posits that social insurance is a luxury
good; as income raises, countries want to minimize their exposure to extreme poverty.  The
demographic heterogeneity theory argues that social insurance is a transfer program created for
like people; in more homogeneous countries the willingness to institute such programs will be
greater.  The Leviathan theory argues that social insurance is created when governments have
excess revenue, most commonly at the end of wars.
Our empirical work tests which of these theories best explains the creation of major
social insurance programs.  In our sample of twenty developed countries, all have old-age and
health-insurance systems.  We estimate hazard models for the creation of these systems, and test
which factors made countries faster or slower to adopt social insurance.
2
We find the most evidence for a negative effect of the level of per capita GDP, that is, the
opposite of Wagner￿s Law.  This reflects the fact that some of the richer countries in our sample
were particularly late in adopting social-insurance institutions, such as the United States.  Our
interpretation is that in richer countries, where private capital markets are more developed, there
is less need for and greater private opposition to the introduction of state insurance systems.  We
also find that ethnically-heterogeneous countries are slower to adopt insurance systems.  This is
consistent with the theory that diverse populations are more suspicious of programs with
potentially redistributive effects.  Finally, we find evidence that Catholic countries are more
likely to adopt insurance-based old age support systems and less likely to adopt means-tested
systems.
                                                                                                                                                            
1 JuppØ￿s French (1995) and Prodi￿s Italian government (1998) collapsed under opposition to pension reforms.
2 Lindert (1994) examines the growth of social transfer spending from 1880 to 1930.  We believe dates of system3
Still, the overall impact of these variables on system adoption is relatively weak.  The
estimates differ quantitatively and qualitatively across specifications, depending on the controls
we include.  We conclude that there are many plausible reasons for the adoption of social
insurance systems, and that different factors might be relevant in different countries.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of social-insurance
programs and their growth in the past century.  Section 3 expands on the theories of the creation
of social-insurance systems.  Section 4 describes the data sets we use to test these theories and
summarizes historical evidence on them.  Section 5 presents evidence from estimated hazard
models.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  The Social-Insurance State
The first social-insurance system was created in Germany in the 1880s.  It consisted of
Accident Insurance, Sickness Insurance and, jointly, Invalidity and Old-Age Insurance, and
covered, by 1925, two-thirds of the labour force, most of them blue-collar workers.  Since then,
social insurance has spread to all developed countries and has grown remarkably in size.
Old-Age Insurance (OAI) is many countries￿ largest social insurance program.  OAI is a
set of income transfers to elderly people, sometimes associated with being out of the labor force
but frequently conditioned only on age.  We distinguish between two fundamental types of OAI
                                                                                                                                                            
adoption are more reliable left-hand side data than the redistributive component of government spending.4
system.
3  Insurance systems are those in which benefits are earnings-related.  The primary
justifications for such systems are insurance against longevity, failures in financial institutions,
or individuals￿ myopia.  Examples include Bismarck￿s original OAI in Germany and the United
States￿ OASI.  Minimum systems are those in which benefits are either means-tested or set at a
flat rate, and thus are designed more as welfare systems, protecting against destitution among the
elderly.  We describe the UK￿s system, with flat-rate benefits for qualified retirees, as a
minimum system.  Holzmann in OECD (1988) attempts to distinguish a third class of ￿mixed￿
systems, which include both a guaranteed minimum benefit and earnings-related benefits.  This
distinction is problematic since every insurance system guarantees some minimum benefit.  We
thus classify all systems where benefits increase with marginal contributions as insurance
systems.
Table 1 gives some evidence on the size of OAI programs.  Our sample is seventeen
developed countries.  The first row shows that OAI programs
4 are sizeable.  In 1995, OAI was
11.1 percent of GDP in the average developed country.  These programs vary considerably in
size, however.   In 1995, the standard deviation of OAI as a percentage of GDP was 3.8.   The
second row shows that OAI has increased rapidly as a share of GDP, and that the growth rate of
OAI has differed greatly across countries.  Between 1960 and 1995, the mean increase in OAI as
a share of GDP was 6.7 percent, with a standard deviation of 3 percent.  Rows three and four
show that OAI is a large and increasing share of total government expenditure.
                                                
3 Some writers distinguish between contributory and non-contributory systems (for example, Williamson and
Pampel (1993)), but the distinction between earmarked and non-earmarked contributions seems minor.  It would be
interesting to distinguish between funded and unfunded systems, but all the systems we analyze are unfunded.  The
distinction between insurance and minimum systems is similar to Esping-Andersen￿s (1990) distinction between
￿liberal￿ and ￿corporatist￿ systems.
4 Our OAI spending data are from the OECD Social Expenditure Database, and include Old-Age cash benefits,
survivors benefits, disability benefits, and services to the elderly and disabled.5
The differential sizes of OAI systems are not simply determined by demographics.
Figure 1 shows the relation between the size of OAI in GDP in 1995 and the share of the
population over age 65.
5  While the regression line is positively-sloped (=1.65, t19=5.57), the fit
is imperfect (R
2=0.62).
6  Particular outliers are Austria, where the state pension ages of 55 for
women and 60 result in high spending conditional on demographics, and Japan, which paid few
old age insurance benefits until the 1960s.
The fifth and seventh rows of Table 1 show that insurance systems are generally larger
than minimum systems.  In 1995 the average insurance system in our sample consumed 11.9
percent of GDP, while the average minimum system consumed 8.5 percent.  The sixth and eighth
rows show that insurance systems have grown more rapidly than minimum systems over the past
few decades.  Looking only at the systems which have remained the same type since 1960, the
average growth in percentage points of GDP consumed is 6.8 for insurance systems and 5.1 for
minimum systems.  Systems which paid flat-rate benefits in 1960 but then added an earnings-
related component might be expected to have grown the fastest of all.  Column nine shows that,
indeed, these ￿switching systems￿ added 8.2 percentage points of GDP between 1960 and 1995.
The extremes of the growth experience are Finland and Australia: Finland￿s pension spending
grew by 11.2 percentage points of GDP between 1960 and 1995, Australia￿s by only 1.7
percentage points.
                                                
5  Here data are used from the seventeen countries in Table 1, plus New Zealand, Portugal and Spain, for which
OECD (1997) lacks government expenditure data for 1960.
6 There are twenty countries in figures 1 and 2, which refer to 1995, but only seventeen in table 1, which refer to
some changes between 1960 and 1995, because of missing data for 1960.6
Institutional variation is even greater in health insurance.  National Health Insurance
(NHI) has been adopted in all the countries in our sample, given that we interpret US Medicare
as an NHI system, and Switzerland introduced compulsory health insurance in 1994.  Because
NHI is a service and not just an income transfer, the variation in arrangements across countries is
greater than for OAI.  For example, Britain, Italy and Spain have systems where physicians are
state employees, while other countries have private providers with only a contractual relationship
with the government.  The last four rows in Table 1 show information on the size of NHI
programs.  NHI programs increased from 2.4 percent of GDP in 1960 to 6.2 percent of GDP in
1995.  This 3.8-point average growth has a large standard deviation, however, of 1.3 percentage
points of GDP.  As figure 2 shows, the size of medical spending is only loosely related to the
size of the aged population.  The regression line in figure 2 is barely upward-sloping (=0.06,
t19=0.47), and the R
2 is only 0.01.  Thus, more than just demographics explain the variation in
medical spending across countries.
3.  Theories of the Birth and Growth of Social Insurance
The economic and political science literatures have advanced a number of (often
contradictory) theories for the birth and growth of OAI and NHI.  We group the theories into five
categories:
Ravages of Capitalism.  This theory stresses the role that capitalism plays in encouraging
development of social insurance systems.  Life in cities can be more difficult than life in7
agricultural settings, as the distinction between employment and unemployment becomes
sharper.  Recessions are also more prevalent in capitalist societies, leading to increased periods
without income.  Further, extended families may be less likely to live together in cities.  Thus,
one might expect that social insurance would develop more rapidly in capitalist systems.
The idea that insurance becomes necessary in capitalist economies is evident in the
rhetoric used by Franklin Roosevelt to justify the US Social Security Act.
7  Earlier British
pension campaigners had argued that capitalist production created a new problem of ￿worn-out
industrial workers￿.  MacNicol (1998) cites a British pro-OAI pamphlet of 1900 entitled The
Worn-Out Workman: What is to be Done With Him?.
8  The US adoption of Social Security in
1935 may be interpreted as supporting this theory: both Weaver (1982) and Miron and Weil
(1998) argue that the Depression was necessary for Roosevelt to pass the SSA.  However, the
Bismarckian format of US OAI does not reflect these Depression origins: Weaver argues that
means-tested Old Age Assistance was the more popular component of the 1935 Act.  The
Townsend pension plan, and Huey Long￿s ￿Share the Wealth￿ pension plan, each popular in the
early 1930s, both proposed flat-rate pensions conditional on retirement at 60.
9
                                                
7 For example, Roosevelt￿s Message of the President to Congress, June 8, 1934: "Security was attained in the earlier
days through the interdependence of members of families upon each other and of the families within a small
community upon each other.  The complexities of great communities and of organized industry make less real these
simple means of security.  Therefore, we are compelled to employ the active interest of the Nation as a whole
through government in order to encourage a greater security for each individual who composes it.￿
8 MacNicol (1998) p.142; this pamphlet was published by the ￿National Committee of Organised Labour for
Promoting Old Age Pensions for All￿.
9  The Social Security Administration￿s website, at http://www.ssa.gov/history/history.html, provides detail on both
the Townsend and Long plans.  Long, in a 1934 speech to the Senate (also linked on this site), justified his pension
plan primarily as a means to remove older workers from the labour force.  As Miron and Weil (1998) note, Social
Security initially reflected this aim, making benefits conditional on complete retirement.  Retirement or earnings
tests for Social Security benefits have since been progressively reduced.8
Political Legitimacy Theory.  This theory posits that countries in which the executive is
not elected, or in which for other reasons the State lacks legitimacy, will be the first to introduce
social insurance programs.  In this theory, OAI and NHI are intended to dissipate political
opposition and to give important societal groups an interest in the continuity of the State.  This
theory was posited most strongly by Flora and Alber (1981).
The evidence most commonly cited for this theory is the birth of social insurance in
Germany.  Bismarck wrote as early as 1871 that ￿The only means of stopping the Socialist
movement in its present state of confusion is to put into effect those Socialist demands which
seem justified and which can be realized within the framework of the present order of state and
society.￿
10  Bismarck￿s social legislation followed his anti-Socialist bill of 1878 which, following
assassination attempts on the Kaiser, dissolved socialist parties, banned publications and
detained or deported several thousand people.  Thus social insurance was explicitly justified as a
second method of combating dissent.  Flora and Alber see Bismarck￿s need to legitimize the new
German ￿order of state and society￿ as having been particularly acute because neither the Kaiser
nor the chancellor were elected, and because the German state created in 1870 failed to include
Austria, which some considered part of ￿greater Germany￿.  That the German Social Democratic
Party supported the war effort in 1914 is seen as a victory for Bismarck￿s policy of binding
industrial workers to the Second Reich.  Somewhat similarly, Mesa-Lago (1978) describes
Argentina￿s semi-military leader Juan Per￿n￿s creation of OAI (in 1946) as cementing an
alliance between his regime and influential industrial unions.  A corollary of this theory is that
non-democratic countries will create systems similar to insurance schemes rather than
introducing means-tested benefits.  This would occur since insurance systems affect politically9
important blue-collar workers, not just the indigent, and because they give workers more sense
that ￿the State has their money￿, and thus an interest in the State￿s survival.
Olson (1982) posits a theory somewhat contradictory to the ￿political legitimacy￿ theory.
Olson argues that social insurance institutions reflect the desire of the poor for redistribution, and
thus that democracies will create them before non-democratic governments.  Olson￿s theory is
similar to the political legitimacy theory, however, in predicting that democracies are more likely
to introduce redistributive, minimum insurance systems than are non-democracies.
Wagner￿s Law.  The third theory is that social insurance is a luxury good created when
countries get rich enough.  The theory stems from Wagner￿s hypothesis (1892) that income
growth explains the growth of government in general.  Income effects might work through
several mechanisms.  The direct effect is the demand for poverty relief in wealthier countries.
There is a potential indirect effect if OAI or NHI later becomes a constraint on growth.  In such a
case, we might expect social insurance to be reduced in periods of low growth.
Income effects might be seen in the birth of the British and Australian OAI systems in
1908.  According to Maddison￿s historical series, in 1900 only the US had a higher per-capita
GDP than these two countries.  Both countries adopted redistributive systems financed by
general revenue in 1908, which could reflect a ￿taste for redistribution￿ which increases with
wealth.
                                                                                                                                                            
10 Z￿llner (1982), p.13.10
Demographic Heterogeneity.  Heterogeneity theories emphasize that government
programs with redistributive effects will be slower to emerge in countries with ethnically,
linguistically, or religiously-divided populations.  Easterly and Levine (1997) argue this theory
helps explain government spending across countries, and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)
argue it helps explain variation in local government￿s spending across the US.
Evidence on the importance of demographic heterogeneity is frequently found in the
relatively slow development of social insurance in the US.  As Table 2 shows, by 1935, when the
Social Security Act was passed, the US was a relative laggard in the construction of OAI.
Canada￿s federal structure, arguably itself a product of its heterogeneity, delayed its introduction
of OAI, and since 1965 Quebec and the rest of Canada have had separate earnings-related OAI
schemes.
A separate demographic theory is that, since unfunded OAI immediately benefits the
elderly, the birth and growth of OAI will be related to the share of the elderly in the population
and thus their political power.  Indeed, not only current retirees but also near retirees would
favour the creation of an unfunded pension system.
11  It is certainly folklore in the United States
that as the elderly share of the population grows, it will become increasingly difficult to cut back
on transfers to that group
12.
Leviathan Theory.  The Leviathan theory stresses that social insurance programs are
created to expand the range of government as much as possible.  The key constraint on the
                                                
11 Browning (1975) shows that, facing disproportionately low contributions for similar benefits, middle-aged
workers will desire a bigger pay-as-you-go system than will the young.11
growth of government is not the need for social insurance but the ability of government to get the
revenues necessary to pay for it.  Such revenues are most commonly available after they are no
longer needed for other purposes, since they do not require new taxes.
British pension policy following the Boer and World Wars suggests such an
interpretation.  Peacock and Wiseman (1961) note that during each of these wars British
government expenditures spiked upwards and fell only slightly afterwards.
13  These wars￿ ends
in 1902, 1918 and 1945 shortly predate the creation of British old-age pensions (1908), their
expansion from 70 to 65-year-olds (1925), and the abandonment of the means test (1948).
Peacock and Wiseman argue for the path-dependence of tax rates, noting that ￿experience
obtained during World War I in the techniques and administrative problems of assessing lower
income groups for income tax provided the foundation for the permanent extension of that tax.
[During World War II] the purchase tax was first introduced - as a ￿temporary￿ expedient - and
the revenue-raising potentialities of the tobacco tax came to be fully appreciated.￿  The Boer War
was also a stimulant to the creation of British Health Insurance (1911) as the poor health of
conscripts revealed the squalid conditions of contemporary working-class life.
14  The
development of Japanese Health Insurance from 1927 onwards is also often connected with a
desire to improve the health of conscripts.
15
                                                                                                                                                            
12  For example, see Peterson and Howe, (1988), p.19-20 on the strength of the US ￿gray￿ lobby.
13  This upward step remains after increased debt interest payments are subtracted from government spending
(Peacock and Wiseman p.58).  Wagner made a similar argument.
14  In 1900 army doctors rejected for military service eleven of every twelve men in East London (Eder 1982 p.5).
15  Nishimura and Yoshikawa, (1993) write that ￿...as Japan moved toward entry into the pacific War, the extension
of health coverage was couched in the rationale of ￿Healthy People, Healthy Soldiers￿.￿12
Demonstration Effects.  We also allow for the potential that countries mimic their
neighbours￿ social insurance programs.  Many countries introduced close copies of the German
system, and others had them imposed after German invasions.  There is a commonality to social
insurance programs in former Commonwealth countries as well.  Given this history, and the
observation that countries with linguistic or political links introduced similar types of system, it
may be that cross-country demonstration effects are more important than conditions within
countries.  We test this as well in our empirical work.
We use historical data on the timing of the introduction of OAI and NHI systems to
estimate why different countries adopted social insurance systems when they did.  We describe
these results in the next two sections.
4.  The Birth of Social Insurance
To analyze the factors influencing the birth of social-insurance systems, we have
gathered data on the adoption of OAI and NHI systems and major system changes in 20 OECD
and Latin American countries.  This sample is common to many studies of the size of the public
sector.  Further, it includes countries at roughly equal levels of development.
16
For each of these countries, we have read as many historical accounts as possible of the
development of OAI and NHI.  These histories and the dates of introduction are summarized in
Tables 2 (Old-Age Insurance) and 3 (Health Insurance).13
The first system in Table 2 is the German Old-Age and Disability Insurance legislated in
1889 and first paying benefits in 1891.  Though this system had important precursors in France
17
and Prussia
18, both responses to the European revolutions of 1848, Bismarck￿s system was the
first compulsorily to insure substantial numbers of workers.  His system was compulsory for
lower-income blue-collar workers only, and was financed by employer, employee and state
contributions.  Both contributions and benefits were income-related, requiring that employers
keep files on their workers￿ contribution histories.  In this period the administration of such a
system represented a bureaucratic achievement beyond the capabilities of many states.
19  In 1891
11.5 million workers were insured, of a total population of 49 million.
20  The income threshold
below which insurance was compulsory was successively raised, and in 1911 a separate but
similar scheme was set up for white-collar employees.  In 1925, out of a total workforce of 32
million and population of 62 million, 17.5 million were insured in the workers￿ scheme, 2.8
million in the white collars￿ scheme, and 875,000 in a separate miners￿ insurance scheme.  Thus
fairly quickly German Old-Age and Disability Insurance covered a substantial proportion of the
population, though rural workers were excluded until 1957.
The German lead, though much studied elsewhere, was followed by rather dissimilar OAI
systems: Denmark and New Zealand introduced universal means-tested systems, in 1891 and
                                                                                                                                                            
16 The countries are the seventeen listed in the note to Table 1, plus New Zealand, Spain and Portugal.
17  Bismarck was influenced by the French system of subsidised voluntary pensions created in 1850 following the
revolution of 1848, and encouraged by Emperor Napoleon III.  Thus Bismarck to the Reichstag, during the 1889
debate on the Old-Age and Disability bill, ￿I have lived in France long enough to know that the faithfulness of most
of the French to their government...is largely connected with the fact that most of the French receive a state
pension.￿, Z￿llner in K￿hler et. al., (1982) p.13.
18  See Ritter (1983) p.20-3 on the Prussian legislation of the 1850s.
19  Hennock (1987) describes the British view of the German system.
20  Ritter (1983) Table 3 p.191 estimates coverage rates; the figures for 1925 are from the German Statistical14
1898 respectively, financed from general revenues.  These were both wealthy agricultural
countries, and Petersen (1990) argues that the desire to relieve rural poverty influenced the
Danish choice of such a system.  Britain (and thus Ireland) and Australia also introduced means-
tested pensions in 1908.  Pensions in Britain were payable at 70, and in New Zealand and
Australia at 65.  The Australian national system followed the deep recession it had experienced
during the 1890s.
21  British private mutual societies resisted state pensions in the nineteenth
century but, suffering from solvency problems due to over-estimates of mortality, did not resist
them after the Boer war.  Particularly in Ireland, the pensions means-test was soon more laxly
applied than had been envisioned, a process common among countries which began with such
restrictive systems.
22  The means-tested systems in the Commonwealth countries were closer to
pre-existing Poor Law provision than Bismarckian social insurance.  However, their size and the
weaker conditions attached to their receipt marked a substantial departure from the principles of
the Poor Law.
23
Policymakers in the Scandinavian countries had been attentive to the German OAI
legislation, yet the Scandinavian systems followed, before World War II, the Danish example
more closely.  Sweden introduced a universal earnings-related system in 1913, but this was soon
overshadowed in size by additional means-tested benefits.  By 1939 Norway and Finland also
had means-tested systems, as, following the other Commonwealth countries, did Canada.
                                                                                                                                                            
Yearbook.
21  Castles (1985), p.57-8 speculates on the importance of this recession to Australia￿s adoption of Old-Age Pensions
in 1908.
22  Gilbert (1966).
23  A Poor Law had existed in England since 1601.  Bruce (1961), p.156, notes that, in contrast to previous kinds of
poor relief, British Old-Age Pensions after 1908 did not require the recipients￿ disqualification from voting.15
Many countries in continental Europe adopted contributory OAI systems compulsory for
urban workers with salaries below a specified limit between the World Wars.  Thus the Belgian,
Italian, French and Austrian schemes were all similar to Bismarck￿s.  Inter-war French
governments were provoked to introduce a social-insurance system partly because, having
repossessed Alsace and Lorraine from Germany in 1919, they thought continuing the popular
insurance systems there necessary, and thought it anomalous that only some regions in the
country should have compulsory insurance.
24  The Italian, Belgian and French systems were all
reorganised and extended after World War II, though they retained their earnings-related
structure.  The Spanish and Portuguese systems remained very small until the advent of
democracy in these countries in the 1970s.  US Social Security developed much as the 1935 Act
specified 
25, though the benefit increases included in the 1939 amendments ensured that the
planned large Trust Fund did not materialize.  Only in 1950 did earnings-related Old Age
Insurance benefits first exceed means-tested Old Age Assistance, part of the 1935 act, which was
intended specifically to alleviate the effects of the depression.  The Japanese system created in
1942 paid few benefits and was restricted to employees.  However, as can be seen in the case of
health care, Japanese governments before 1945 enthusiastically implemented Bismarckian social
insurance programs.  In 1961 a universal flat-rate pension was introduced to cover the entire
working population, but replacement rates remained low until they were sharply increased in
1974.
26
The immediate post-war era saw new earnings-related OAI programs in Argentina and
Switzerland, a flat-rate system created in the Netherlands, and many system expansions, which,
                                                
24  Immergut (1991), for example, makes this argument in the context of health insurance.
25  This is the argument of Miron and Weil (1998).16
as Pelzman (1980) notes, occurred in neutral as well as former combatant countries.  A feature of
OAI reform in this period was the abandonment of means-testing (in Sweden, Britain and
Canada) amidst war-engendered desires for more universal systems typified by the British
Beveridge Report of 1942.
Universal systems were politically limited, however, since raising the level of benefits
was extremely costly.  Many of the OAI reforms of the 1950s and 1960s either introduced
(Canada, Norway, Finland and Sweden) or extended (Germany, Italy, France, the US and
Austria) earnings-related systems, as a means of using politically-acceptable taxes to allow many
of the elderly to share in the rapid post-war growth of incomes.  The UK introduced an earnings-
related system in 1978, but this was largely voluntary, since members of occupational schemes
were allowed to opt out of it.
27 Table 2 thus suggests a certain type of institutional hysteresis in
OAI systems: countries sometimes add an earnings-related system to existing minimum benefits,
but they do not end such systems and move back to minimum systems.  As can be seen from row
seven of Table 1, those countries which added earnings-related systems to their minimum
systems since 1960 have experienced particularly large growth in OAI spending.
Table 3 describes the history of Health Insurance systems in our sample.  We date the
creation of health insurance as being when coverage was made compulsory for a broad class of
people, even if the related expenditures did not form part of a government budget.  Bismarck￿s
Germany was again in 1883 the first to introduce a compulsory system.  As with Germany￿s OAI
system, coverage was compulsory only for blue-collar workers earning less than a specified
                                                                                                                                                            
26  See for example the time-series of replacement rates in Oshio and Yashiro (1997).
27  This right originally extended only to members of defined-benefit pension schemes, but was extended to17
limit, which was raised over time.  The system provided both in-kind medical benefits and cash
payments in the event of sickness or pregnancy.  By 1889 6.1 million German workers were
members of one of the component Sickness Funds, about twelve percent of the population
28.  As
with OAI, German Sickness Insurance was financed by a mixture of employer, employee and
general revenue contributions.  Both contributions and benefits were graduated according to
workers￿ incomes.  Benefits were restricted to the insured; for example, cash maternity benefits
were given only to insured women, not to the wives of insured men.
29  By 1925, over 18 million
workers were covered, a roughly comparable number to those insured under Old Age and
Disability Insurance.
Austria, Norway and Switzerland quickly introduced similar Health-Insurance legislation,
though this failed in Switzerland due to private-sector opposition.
30  The initial British response
was that German compulsory insurance necessitated unwonted bureaucracy and compulsion.
However, Prime Minister Lloyd George returned from a visit to Germany in 1908 convinced of
the success of the German system, and proceeded to design a comparable one.  Like the German
scheme, British National (Health) Insurance, adopted in 1911, provided cash and in-kind benefits
and was compulsory only for manual workers, thereby covering around the same thirty percent
of the population as were covered in Germany.
31  The main difference between the two
countries￿ schemes were that mandatory contributions and benefits in Britain were uniform
across workers rather than income-related.  Again imitating Germany, Japan￿s military-
dominated government introduced compulsory Health Insurance for various classes of industrial
                                                                                                                                                            
members of defined-contribution schemes in 1986.
28  Ritter (1983), Table 1 has time series on the growth of German Sickness Insurance.
29  Hennock (1987) p.183 cites this as a difference between German and British health Insurance in 1911.
30  Immergut (1991).18
workers in 1927.  There was an income limit for compulsory insurance and an earnings-related
contribution structure.
32  Health Insurance was extended on a voluntary basis to rural areas in
1938, and compulsorily to white collar workers and seamen in 1939.  Thus by 1943, Japan had
wide health insurance coverage,
33 though this system had to be rebuilt after 1945.
France adopted compulsory Health Insurance for low-income workers in 1930 at the
same time as Old-Age Insurance, with, again, competition with Germany over the loyalty of
Alsace and Lorraine a suggested reason.  Danish private health insurance societies were
subsidised and regulated by the state since at least 1892.  In response to the Depression, four
￿Social Reform Acts￿ were passed in 1933 strengthening Denmark￿s social insurance systems,
and making the right to receive a government old-age pension conditional on being a member of
an approved health insurance fund.  Thus health insurance was essentially compulsory from this
point on, although the state only explicitly took over the health insurers￿ functions in 1973.
34
Similarly, the New Zealand Social Security Act of 1938 introduced universal health benefits and
means-tested sickness benefits in a context similar to that of the US Social Security Act.  New
Zealand￿s first government comprising only the Labour Party (1935-9) introduced many new
measures in response to the perceived inadequacy of existing systems in the face of the
Depression.
35
A number of Health Insurance schemes were introduced in the 1940s, typically in the
form of government compulsion to join, and government regulation of, the pre-existing system
                                                                                                                                                            
31  Hennock p.182.
32  Powell and Anesaki, 1990, p.36-7 give details of the 1927 scheme.
33  Nishimura and Yoshikawa, 1993.
34  See the chapter on Denmark in Maynard (1975), and Parkum (1972).19
of private sickness funds.  In the Netherlands, physicians had resisted plans for a Bismarckian
system proposed since 1904.  As a concession to them, the government scheme introduced in
1930 made insurance only for sickness-related cash payments compulsory for low-income
workers.  In 1941 the German occupying authorities imposed health insurance on the lines of
previously-written, though not-enacted, Dutch legislation.  Insurance for benefits in kind was
made compulsory, and the income threshold below which coverage was compulsory raised
substantially.  After liberation the Dutch system continued in the manner established by the
German authorities.
36 Franco￿s Spain introduced compulsory Sickness Insurance in 1942 for
lower-income industrial workers; initially this system covered only 25 per cent of the population,
but coverage was gradually extended after World War II.
37  Similarly Mussolini￿s Italian
government made membership of a sickness fund compulsory in 1943, and centralized and
imposed state control on these funds.  All salaried people were compelled to contribute.
38
Belgian mutual funds had long been subsidized by the state: after Belgium￿s liberation
employers and workers cooperated to construct a social security system which included
compulsory health insurance, at first with limited coverage.  In Sweden, a network of largely free
public hospitals, financed by local taxes, made compulsory sickness insurance seem less urgent.
Thus, a kind of state health service existed before the Sickness Insurance Act of 1947, which
made membership of one of the voluntary insurance societies compulsory for employees.
39
                                                                                                                                                            
35  Mendelsohn, (1954), Ch. V.
36  Blanpain et. al. (1978) describe the history of Dutch health insurance.
37  Portella and Cuervo in DuPlessis, (1989).
38  Hanao in DuPlessis, (1989).
39  Blanpain et. al. (1978) note that tax-financed hospitals were set up in 1818 to treat soldiers with venereal
diseases, and were retained thereafter to treat the civilian population.20
The remaining countries in our sample all adopted compulsory health-insurance systems
at more recent dates.  The introduction of Bismarckian sickness insurance in Finland was
prevented in the inter-war period by a strong Agrarian party, which did not want its supporters to
pay for urban benefits.  Sickness Insurance as introduced in 1962 covered the entire population.
40
In Argentina, Per￿n introduced health insurance for railroad workers in 1944, and health
insurance also existed for the military and the judiciary before it was extended to all urban
workers under the civilian president Illia in 1964.
41
In the US, interest in federal financing of medical services dates back at least to the
1930s, though President Franklin Roosevelt kept plans for Health Insurance out of the Social
Security Act so as not to impede the progress of the rest of the Act.
42  The 1950 Amendments to
the Social Security Act authorized federal matching grants for state expenditures for medical
costs of recipients of public assistance.  President Truman proposed compulsory health insurance
for the entire population as part of his ￿Fair Deal￿ proposals of 1945.  Truman￿s plan did not pass
Congress, and is thus a counter-example to the theory that insurance schemes are introduced
after wars.  The Medicare Act of 1965 created compulsory insurance only for those over sixty-
five.  Canadian health insurance was seriously proposed in 1934, but failed in part due to a court
ruling that the federal government did not have the power to introduce such systems.  After
World War II, the federal government subsidized the provinces￿ provision of hospital care, and,
following the creation of provincial health insurance plans, passed the Medical Care Act of 1966,
                                                
40  Kangas, (1990).
41  Mesa-Lago, (1978).
42  David, (1985).21
which offered to pay provinces half the cost of insurance plans meeting criteria such as
universality.
43
The cases of Australia and Switzerland show the slight differences between subsidized
private and state health insurance systems.  Attempts to introduce National Health Insurance in
Australia by the Labour government of 1941-9 were successfully resisted by doctors concerned
about restriction of their fees.  Thereafter, a system of heavily-subsidised private care developed.
Another Labour government passed the Medibank law of 1974, creating a levy and general-
taxation-financed Health Insurance Fund from which all citizens were entitled to claim
reimbursements for outpatient care, and which provided for free hospital treatment.  Reforms
introduced in 1976, however, allowed citizens the right to opt out of this levy by providing
evidence of membership of an equally-generous private fund.  Thus private insurance continued
to coexist with heavily state-subsidised medial care.
44  In Switzerland, attempts to introduce
compulsory health insurance from 1899 onwards were repeatedly frustrated by doctors and
private-sector insurance funds.
45  A system of wide-scale though voluntary membership of
subsidised private insurers evolved instead, until insurance for medical care was made
compulsory in 1994.
   Our rough conclusion from this historical evidence is that, while there is some support
for each of the theories we have described, none seems to dominate the others, with
counterexamples existing for any one theory.
                                                
43 Leatt and Williams in Raffel, (1997).
44 Brown (1983) describes the Australian health system and its development.22
Methodology
To examine these conclusions more systematically, we estimate hazard models for the
introduction of social insurance.  Denoting Xi,t as the set of potentially time-varying factors that
might explain system growth, we assume that:
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If 1 is constant, the expected time until adoption is 1/1, though here because 1(t) varies, the
calculation of the expected adoption time is more complicated.  Below we use 1/1 as a rough
estimate of expected time until adoption.  We estimate the baseline hazard 0(t) semi-
parametrically after Cox (1972), so as not to impose an arbitrary baseline time-pattern of
adoptions.
46
Our primary estimates pool the creation of any old-age insurance or national health-
insurance program.  Thus, the model contains 40 observations (20 countries for each type of
system).  We include a dummy variable for the type of system considered.  We also estimate
                                                                                                                                                            
45 Immergut (1992).
46 This is analogous to using time dummies in a panel regression.23
separate models for the adoption of means-tested and insurance (earnings-related) OAI systems,
and that of NHI systems.
Not all social-insurance programs were created at once.  France, for example, created an
Old-Age Insurance system in 1930, but this remained small until after World War II, with around
6.4 million contributors, or 32 percent of the labour force, in 1936.
47  After the refounding of the
system in 1946, spending and coverage grew rapidly, with 12.6 million contributors, 64 percent
of the labour force, in 1955.  Such a multi-phased introduction is hard to capture in a hazard
model.  We use the date of first introduction of a system in our analysis.  We have experimented
with other specifications that allow for multiple periods of creation, but the results did not differ
significantly from those using the birth of a system of any size.
48
Independent Variables
Our independent variables reflect the different theories we advanced above.  Table 4
shows the variables that we use and the theories they proxy for.  We also show summary
statistics in 1900.  The data are measured at decadal intervals, apart from the ￿Ethnic￿ and
￿Catholic￿ variables, which are only observed once per country.
                                                
47  See Reimat (1997), for details of the pre-1946 French system.
48 In regressions using both creations and expansions of OAI as ￿event dates￿, industrialization and Catholicism have
positive effects, but none of the regressors are significant.  Conceptually it is hard in some cases to decide which
expansions were the most significant, which is a problem with estimating this model.  The weak negative effect of
the ￿war￿ variable may be surprising, given the expansions in several countries around 1946, but there were also
several expansions in the late 1950s (Germany, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands).24
The ￿Industry￿ variable is the proportion of a country￿s labour force that was employed in
either manufacturing or extractive (mining) industry, or in construction, and refers to both sexes.
The data used to construct this variable are taken from various editions of Mitchell￿s Historical
Statistics.  The ￿Urbanization￿ variable is the percentage of a country￿s population living in cities
with more than 100,00 occupants.  Data for the European countries are taken from Flora (1983),
for the US from Historical Statistics of the United States
49, and for other countries from censuses
and statistical handbooks.   The ￿Recession￿ variable is constructed from Maddison￿s (1991)
annual series for national GDP.  Its value is the number of years in the preceding decade in
which real GDP shrank.  There are some missing observations due to gaps in Maddison￿s data.
The ￿Non-democracy￿ variable records whether a country had a powerful non-elected
ruler.  Here we follow Flora and Alber as coding pre-1914 Austria, Germany and Sweden as
being monarchies (thus non-democracies), while the Netherlands and Britain are recorded as
democracies since their monarchs had few powers
50.  Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and countries
under its occupation are coded as non-democracies, as is Per￿n￿s Argentina
51 and pre-1945
Japan.  We also test whether Catholicism made social insurance more politically acceptable,
since the Catholic church typically plays a more extensive role in society than do Protestant
churches.  The ￿Catholic￿ variable is the percentage of the 1996 population recorded as being
Catholics in the Catholic Almanac
52.   Therefore we have had to assume that the level of
Catholicism in a country has been fairly stable over time.
                                                
49  US Department of Commerce (1975).
50  See Flora and Alber (1981) p.71 for divisions of countries into democracies and monarchies prior to 1914.
51 Although there were elections in many of the states coded as being democracies, some executive such as the
German Kaiser and Chancellor was not elected.  Mesa-Lago (1978) describes Peron as a military, not a civilian
ruler.
52  The Catholic Almanac is a yearly compendium of facts about the Catholic faith.25
The ￿Ethno-linguistic fractionalization￿ variable measures the probability in 1960 that
two citizens of a country would differ either by ethnic or linguistic group.  This variable was
created by authors in the former Soviet Union,
53 but Easterly and Levine (1997) defend its
quality and show that it correlates strongly with other measures of heterogeneity.  The ￿Elderly￿
variable is the proportion of the population aged 65 and above, and comes from country
censuses
54.  The per-capita GDP data come from Maddison￿s historical series for GDP and
population, and from the Penn World Tables, both of which express GDP in 1985 US dollars.
Here we use some constant-growth imputations of GDP per capita where Maddison￿s series lack
observations.
55  The ￿War￿ variable, which we interpret as reflecting the ￿Leviathan￿ view of
government growth, is a dummy variable equal to one if a country was a combatant in a major
war during the previous decade.  The wars included are the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, the Boer
war, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, the Japanese invasion of China (1936), the World Wars,
and the Korean and Vietnam wars involving the US.
Two demonstration effects are used as regressors.  The first is an indicator variable for a
country with the same language having previously adopted the given type of system.  Thus in
1900 the US has a demonstration dummy equal to unity in its period ￿at risk￿ of adopting OAI,
since New Zealand had already adopted such a scheme, but not in its period ￿at risk￿ of adopting
health insurance.  In the construction of this variable, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany,
Austria and Switzerland are assumed to have the same Germanic language, and Danish, Swedish
and Norwegian are assumed to be the same language.  The second demonstration effect is an
                                                
53  The variable appeared in S. I. Bruk, V.S. Apenchenko, Atlas Narodov Mira, Moskow, 1964.
54  Many of the pre-1950 data are summarized in a United Nations (1956) volume.
55  Thus for example Maddison has Swiss GDP data in 1890 and 1924; we interpolate assuming a constant growth
rate between these dates.  We have also extrapolated Maddison￿s (1989) series for Argentina, Portugal, Spain and26
indicator variable for occupation within the previous decade by a country with the given type of
system.  All of the occupations in our data set are by Germany.
56
Table 5 shows the correlation of the different independent variables in 1900.
Urbanization, industrialization and GDP growth are positively correlated, with the latter two
variables particularly strongly related.  We examine in our empirical work whether the effect of
these different variables can be differentiated.  More surprising is that the ￿non-democracy￿
variable is negatively related to these measures of economic advancement.  Some of the less-
developed countries in our sample (Finland, Japan, Argentina, Spain and Portugal) had not
achieved democracy by 1900.
5.  Results: The Creation of Social Insurance
Figures 3 (a) to (e) show univariate plots of the date of introduction of either old-age or
health insurance against our explanatory variables measured in 1900.  Dates at which health
insurance was introduced are distinguished by an ￿M￿ prefixing the relevant country￿s name.
Since the date of introduction increases along the y-axis, if an explanatory variable caused
systems to be introduced earlier, this would imply a negatively-sloped regression line.  The
adoption of health insurance is allowed to occur later than that of OAI by a constant term, thus
the parallel regression lines in these figures.   These figures show higher rates of
industrialization, urbanization and of the proportion elderly are associated with slightly earlier
                                                                                                                                                            
New Zealand back from 1900 to 1880.
56  In 1920 (though not before) France is recorded as recently having been occupied by Germany, due to its recovery27
introduction, and higher ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and per-capita GDP are associated with
later introduction.
Table 6 shows hazard-model estimates for the introduction of an OAI or NHI system.
We report the coefficients in the form e
; thus, a value above one implies that the variable causes
the adoption probability to rise, or adoption to occur earlier.  We refer to this as a ￿positive￿
effect.  The last column in Table 6 gives a sense of the magnitude of the coefficients.  Given that
the average year of adoption of OAI systems in our sample is 1923, this column reports the
change in the date of adoption, in years, implied by a one-standard-deviation increase in the
regressor.  Where the regressor is a dummy variable, this column reports the effect of its value
being one rather than zero.  Though only an approximate method of finding the implications of
the coefficients for adoption dates, this permits a more intuitive quantification of our variables￿
effects.
57
The columns of Table 6 report regressions for each class of theories.  The most important
variables (besides the demonstration effects) are ethnic fragmentation, income, and non-
democracy.  The more ethnically-fragmented countries adopted insurance systems later.  As
figure 3(c) suggests, low measured heterogeneity in Germany and high measured heterogeneity
in Switzerland are important to this result.  The last column shows that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the ethnic fragmentation index implies each social insurance system is adopted 19
                                                                                                                                                            
of Alsace and Lorraine in 1919, held by Germany from 1871-1919.
57  The hazard rate 1 = 0.[exp1expX1+...+expkexpXk], if constant over time, would imply an expected time until
adoption of 1/1.  Assuming (counterfactually) that 1 is constant over time, an increase in X1 by 1 would multiply
1 by exp(11) and the expected adoption time by exp(-11).  Since the average time from 1880 until adoption is
42.25 years, this procedure produces the change in date of adoption shown in the last column of Table 6.28
years later.  Thus this coefficient is large in magnitude, if imprecisely estimated.  GDP per capita
has a substantially negative effect on adoption probabilities, contrary to the Wagner￿s Law
theory.  A one-standard-deviation increase in log GDP per capita in 1900 (roughly how much
richer Britain was than Germany at this point) implies OAI adoption 12 years later in the richer
country.  Non-democracy has a positive effect on system adoption, as the ￿political legitimacy￿
theory predicted.  Countries that were always democracies are predicted to adopt insurance
systems 16 years later than those that never had democracy.  The coefficient on the
demonstration effect from linguistically similar countries is surprising, but reflects the
differences in policy between, for example, Germany and the Netherlands, and Britain and the
US.  The effect of German invasions appears as expected in the coefficient on the second
demonstration effect.
Table 7 includes the different variables in the regression together.  Again we observe a
positive effect of for non-democracy and a negative effect of per-capita GDP and ethnic
heterogeneity, but none of our coefficients are significant.  The level of industrialization enters
positively in these regressions.  Columns 2 and 3 show that the opposite signs of industrialization
and GDP are not merely a result of the considerable positive correlation between these two
variables; the signs of the variables are similar when the other is excluded.  Our other variables
are measured as having very little effect.  Table 7 shows that colinearity between our regressors
makes their effects hard to distinguish.  For example, some of the earlier countries to adopt
insurance systems, such as Germany, Austria and Japan, were poor and non-democratic in the
relevant period, and are also ethnically homogenous.29
The role of some factors may be obscured in Table 7 by pooling all social-insurance
systems together.  As our earlier discussion suggested, insurance and minimum systems may
respond to very different factors.  To test this, Table 8 reports hazard models for the two systems
separately.  The first two columns of Table 8 show hazard models for means-tested and
insurance systems, with a country censored in one estimate when it has adopted the other.  In
these two columns the coefficients on ￿Catholic￿ and ￿Ethnic￿ were estimated as exploding
towards positive infinity or zero, so we report which of these occurred rather than the actual
coefficient.  The coefficient on the ￿ethnic￿ variable is unstable in the regressions in this table,
due to the small number of observations and the fixity of the ￿ethnic￿ variable over time.
58  The
third column shows the hazard for any Old-Age Insurance system, and the fourth the hazard for a
National Health Insurance system.  The last column shows the likelihood ratio test for whether
each variable has the same effect on means-tested as on insurance systems.
59  Three results stand
out from this table: richer countries were more likely to adopt means-tested systems, and
Catholic and non-democratic countries were more likely to adopt insurance systems.  With
twenty observations, however, the power of the tests of the restrictions that the variables have the
same effect on the adoption of both types of system is likely to be low.
Defining which type of OAI system a country introduced first is not always simple.  The
US, for example, introduced means-tested Old Age Assistance as part of the 1935 Social
Security Act.  We code the US as having introduced an ￿insurance￿ system first, as earnings-
                                                
58  In univariate regressions, the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on each of the three hazards is negative, as is found in
Tables 6 and 7.  In the multivariate regressions in Table 8, the ￿ethnic￿ coefficient is typically strongly positive, a
seemingly spurious result.  The coefficients from univariate regressions of ￿Means-tested￿ and ￿Insurance￿ hazards
on ethnic heterogeneity are 0.796 and 0.635 respectively, suggesting no differential effect.
59  If LU is the unconstrained likelihood, and LC the likelihood with J constraints, the statistic   -2(ln(LC)-ln(LU))   is
distributed as 
2
(J)  under the null that the constraints are true.30
related OASDI was eventually the more significant of the systems introduced in 1935.  The
reverse is true of Sweden; although an insurance system was introduced in 1913, means-tested
benefits soon became more widely claimed.  The implication of different coding choices, and our
main results from Table 8, are illustrated in figures 4 (a) to (c).
First, figure 4 (a) shows the dates of OAI system adoption and the type of system
adopted, by countries￿ level of per-capita GDP in 1900.  The hazard coefficients depend both on
how rich the adopters were and how quickly they adopted each type of system.  Hence in the
hazard for adoption of means-tested systems, Australia adds to the coefficient on GDP because it
is both to the bottom and to the right of the scatter.  Figure 4 (a) shows that the relatively early
adoption of means-tested systems by the British Commonwealth countries and by Denmark, and
the adoption of insurance systems by Spain, Italy and Germany, which were poorer in 1900,
drive the difference between the GDP coefficients in the first two columns of Table 8.  A change
in the coding of the type of system initially adopted by either Sweden or the US only increases
the differential in the coefficients on per capita GDP.  Since this model treats the hazards of
adopting each type of system as being independent, using the method outlined above, our
coefficients imply that a country one standard deviation richer than the mean in 1900 would
adopt a means-tested system twenty-two years earlier but an insurance system twenty-four years
later than a country with mean GDP per capita.
Second, figure 4 (b) shows the type and date of OAI systems first introduced in each
country by the level of professed Catholic belief in 1996.  Here we can see why the coefficients
on Catholicism in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 tended to zero and infinity: all the most heavily31
Catholic countries introduced insurance systems, whilst many of the countries with the least
Catholics introduced means-tested systems.  Again coding the Swedish and American systems
differently changes the results little.  The difference between the effects of Catholic belief on the
hazard of adopting each type of system is reflected in the significant likelihood ratio statistic in
column 5.
Third, our results show support for the political legitimacy theory.  As Tables 6 and 7
show, non-democracies are more likely to adopt social insurance programs than are democracies,
and they are more likely to adopt insurance relative to means-tested systems, as the instability
theory predicted.  The coefficients in Table 8 imply that a consistently non-democratic country
would be seventeen years later to adopt a means-tested system but twelve years earlier to adopt
an insurance system than a democracy.  As figure 4 (c) shows, the differential effect of
democracy is largely driven by the adoption of means-tested systems in New Zealand, Australia
and the UK.
Finally, Table 8 helps explain the puzzling negative effect of per-capita GDP in Table 6.
High income countries are less likely to adopt social insurance systems - contrary to Wagner￿s
Law - but when they do adopt systems they are more redistributive than insurance.  This is
consistent with the luxury-good theory of social insurance.32
6. Conclusions
Our overall results on the adoption of social insurance programs are mixed.  In univariate
regressions, we find that richer countries adopt insurance systems later, as do more ethnically- or
linguistically-heterogenous countries.  However, these results are much weaker in models with
multiple regressors, because of correlation between our regressors and our limited sample size.
Our analysis of the type of system adopted is more consistent with the theories.  Higher-
income countries are slower to adopt social insurance systems, but when they do adopt them,
these systems are more redistributive, consistent with a positive income elasticity for
redistribution.  Heavily Catholic countries are slower to adopt OAI systems, but when they do so
these are more likely to be insurance-style systems.  And non-democratic governments are more
likely to adopt insurance systems, perhaps as a way of building the legitimacy of the state.
The results thus provide support to several of the theories.  But overall, it is difficult to
distinguish among the different theories, and our empirical estimates highlight this difficulty.
Statistically, the difficulty in teasing apart the different theories is a result of the small sample
size and the high correlation of the variables.  More fundamentally, it may reflect the fact that
different factors are operating in different countries.  All of the theories posited find clear
evidence in the case history of some countries, necessarily meaning that other theories do not.
This diversity of explanations reflects the fundamental importance of these systems in many
different ways.33
Indeed, what is particularly apparent about social security systems is how durable they
are.  Systems started for one reason maintain that structure for many decades to come.  Since the
decisions about social insurance programs made at one time extend so far into the future, making
the initial decisions correctly is a particularly important issue.
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   Percent of GDP, 1995 11.1 3.8 5 15.4
   Change in Percent of GDP, 1960-95 6.7 3 1.7 11.2
   Percent of Government Spending, 1995 21.9 5.1 11.2 29.4
   Change in Percent of
   Government Spending, 1960-1995 6.2 5.8 -7.4 14.9
Insurance Systems
   Percent of GDP, 1995 11.9 3.6 5.4 15.4
   Change in Percent of GDP, 1960-95 6.8 2.6 3.1 10.4
Minimum Systems
   Percent of GDP, 1995 8.5 3.6 5 12.5
   Change in Percent of GDP, 1960-95 5.1 3.1 1.7 8.5
Systems which Switched,  Minimum to
Insurance
   Change in Percent of GDP, 1960-95 8.2 3.8 2.6 11.2
Health Insurance
   Percent of GDP, 1995 6.2 1 4.4 8.2
   Change in Percent of GDP, 1960-95 3.8 1.3 2.1 5.6
   Percent of Government Spending, 1995 12.9 3.3 8.5 19.4
   Change in Percent of
   Government Spending, 1960-1995 3.9 4.3 -4.2 13.6
Note: The sample is the following 17 countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
UK and the USA.
Government spending is defined as total government outlays, including government consumption,
subsidies and transfers, debt interest, capital formation, and asset purchases.
OAI systems which switched from minimum to insurance systems between 1960 and 1995 are
included as insurance systems in row 5, which describes levels, but not in row 6, which describes
growth.
Sources: Health data from OECD Health Data 2000 CD-Rom, 1960 OAI spending from OECD
(1988), 1995 OAI spending from OECD SOCX database.  Total outlays of government from
OECD Historical Statistics, 1997 Edition, Table 6.5.39
Table 2: The Introduction of Old-Age Insurance
Time Line Cause of Introduction Type of System Later Changes
1889  Germany Monarchic state tries to Earnings-related contributions Scheme for white-collar workers
1890 Reduce support for socialists. and benefits.  Originally restricted to and below a higher income threshold
Compulsory for blue-collar workers below added in 1911.  Expansion to rest
an income threshold. of workforce in 1957, 1972.
1891 Denmark Relieves rural poverty. Universal coverage since all could apply Benefits originally paid at age 60;
(inc. Iceland) for means-tested benefits. pension age raised to 67 in 1956.
1898 New Zealand Response to recession of 1880 Means-tested system with Eligibility age reduced from 65
1900 -1895 in arguably world￿s Universal coverage. to 60 in reform of 1938.
Richest country per capita.
1908 Britain Rich, highly-industrialized country Universal means-tested Means-testing abandoned
(inc. Ireland), System in 1948.  Voluntary earnings-
And related system from 1978.
Australia Recession of 1890s Universal means-tested system. Addition of universal
1910 flat-rate benefit in 1973
1913 Sweden German demonstration effect, Universal contributory scheme, recedes Means-tested benefits in 1921, flat
but farmers delay system, in as means-tested benefits are introduced rate benefits 1948, new earnings-
Largely agricultural country related system in 1959
1919 Italy, Recession, social unrest follow Bismarckian, covers all employees Extended to self-employed,
and First World War farmers 1957-61
1920 Spain Social unrest follows First World War, Covers all private-sector employees with System reorganized in 1963,
Though Spain a non-combatant Earnings below an income threshold income threshold abolished.
Rapid spending growth after
Democratisation in late 1970s.
1924 Belgium Industrialization prompts but Compulsory scheme for workers below Basic structure retained in post-
Church-Socialist competition Income limit.  Separate, larger scheme for liberation reorganization of 1944.
Delays introduction White-collars in 1925.
1927 Canada Ethnic heterogeneity, federal Universal means-tested Flat-rate benefits from 1951, new
Constitution delay introduction System earnings-related system in 1965
1928 Austria Recession of 1920s.  Limited system Covers workers; insurance benefits German occupiers impose their
for white-collar workers since 1906.* Suspended, pays assistance benefits insurance system in 1938
*  By 1926 only 7 percent of the labour force were covered under this earlier scheme; by 1931 43 percent were covered.40
Table 2: (continued) The Introduction of Old-Age Insurance
Time Line Cause of Introduction Type of System Later Changes
1930 France German demonstration effect, Originally covers blue-collars only, System is extended in 1946 to
1930 after return of Alsace-Lorraine in 1919 Subject to an upper income limit cover farmers, white-collars,
but redistribution is minimal
1935 Portugal Introduced by new dictator Salazar Earnings-related system for wage-earners Extended to rural workers 1962-9,
in industry and services minimum benefit in 1974
1936 Norway Introduction delayed by arguments over Universal means-tested Means-testing abandoned in 1957.
degree of redistribution System Earnings-related system added in 1967.
1937 Finland Introduction delayed by lack of
sovereignty and democracy until
Means-tested system with additional small
earnings-related component.
Means-testing abandoned in 1957.
Earnings-related system added in 1960.
end of First World War.
1937 USA Severe Recession Means-tested OAA benefits are Substantial increase in benefits
surpassed in size by earnings-related and coverage 1950-60.
1940 OASI benefuts around 1950 Means-tested SSI from 1971.
1942 Japan Tax increase to prevent wartime Covers employees and their families No benefits paid until 1965.
Inflation Benefits related in part to earnings, partly Flatter system for self-employed
only to months of contribution in 1961.
1944 Argentina Military ruler Peron pacifies unions Previous system covering specific groups Extended to rural, self-employed
extended to urban workers professional workers in 1954
1947 Netherlands Wartime recession, postwar universalism Near-universal system with income-tested Universal flat-rate system from
Pensions 1957, generous disability
insurance from 1967
1948 Switzerland Delayed by opposition of Universal earnings-related system
well-developed private funds41
Table 3: The Introduction of Health Insurance
Time Line Cause of Introduction Type of System Later Changes
1880
1883 Germany Monarchy In-kind and cash benefits for 1911: income ceiling  raised,
low-income workers Extended to servants and
Agricultural workers
1890 1889 Austria Monarchy, follows Germany closely Benefits for low-income blue-collars Extended to family members
After Anschluss in 1938
1909 Norway Follows Germany closely Benefits for low-income blue-collars
1910
1911 Britain Response to union militancy, Benefits for low-income blue-collars National Health Service
Poor health of conscripts in 1948
1927 Japan Military government, concerns over Benefits for low-income blue-collars Extended 1938-9, during WWII
Physical quality of conscripts, labour force New universal system in 1961
1930 France Again competition with Benefits for low-income blue-collars Extended in 1945
1930 Germany over Alsace-Lorraine
1933 Denmark Response to Depression Becomes compulsory to insure privately State Health Insurance in 1973
1935 Portugal Introduced by new dictator Salazar Limited measures attached to OAI Act National Health Service in 1979
1938 New Zealand Response to Depression. Universal; free in-patient services
Means-tested sickness payments
1940 1941 Netherlands German Occupiers Impose Scheme Covers low-income workers Acute care extended from 1967
1942 Spain Fascist Covers all salaried employees National Health Service in 1986
1943 Italy Fascist Covers all salaried employees National Health Service
1944 Belgium Considered vital for postwar reconstruction. Covers all salaried employees
1947 Sweden Pre-exisiting system of free, tax-financed Universal system; cash and
1950 Hospitals in-kind benefits.
1962 Finland History of resistance by large rural sector Universal system of cash benefits
1960 Anxious not to fund urban benefits
1964 Argentina Extension of sectoral systems to all urban Cash Sickness benefits for employees Extended to rural workers
Workers in 1971
1965 USA Long resistance from doctors Universal Hospital Insurance for elderly
1970 1966 Canada Compulsory hospital insurance in 1947 Universal Insurance Scheme
1975 Australia History of subsidized voluntary Universal Insurance Scheme Option to opt for private
Insurance Insurance in 1976 ends
Compulsory nature of scheme
1990 1994 Switzerland History of subsidised voluntary insurance, Compulsory Insurance for in-kind benefits,
Private-sector resistance to compulsion voluntary insurance for cash payments42





Industry Percent of labour force employed in industry. 27.2 10.01
Urban Percent of population living in cities with more
than 100,000 occupants.
13.51 9.02




Non-democracy Dummy equal to one if country has a monarchy
or other type of non-elected executive.
0.45 0.51
Catholicism Proportion of Population Catholic in 1996. 0.43 0.37
Demographic Heterogeneity
Ethnic Probability of two citizens being of a different
ethnic or linguistic group in 1960.
0.25 0.22
Elderly Percent of Population over 65. 5.56 1.53
Income Growth/Wagner￿s Law
Ln(GDP/Capita) Log GDP / Capita in 1985 Dollars. 7.67 0.41
Leviathan
War Dummy equal to one if a country was a
combatant in a major war during the preceding
decade.
0.5 0.22
Note: N = 20 for all but recession years, where N=14.43
























0.31 0.06 -0.48 0.19
Percent
Elderly
-0.02 -0.29 -0.07 -0.17 -0.35
Log GDP
per capita
0.67 0.57 -0.61 -0.08 0.53 -0.23
Recent
Recession
-0.24 0.2 -0.37 0.08 0.33 -0.52 0.0544
Table 6:  Explaining the Birth of Social-Insurance Systems
[Dependent Variable: Year of Adoption of System; Coefficients are Hazard Rates]
123 4 567 Effect of 1  Change,
Adoption Year
Capitalism
  Industrialization 1.0003
(0.01)
-0.1
  Urbanization 0.996
(-0.3)
2
  Recession Years in





  Non-democracy 1.59
 (1.4)
-16


































  N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
  ln(Likelihood) -108 -107 -106 -108 -106 -108 -106
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses.  A dummy is included where the hazard in question is the adoption of
medical insurance.  Errors are clustered by country. ** Denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, * at
the 10% level.45
Table 7:  Explaining the Birth of Social Insurance Systems
[Dependent Variable: Year of Adoption of System]
123
Capitalism
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      N 40 40 40
      ln(Likelihood) -104 -104.7 -105.2
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses.  A dummy is included where the
hazard in question is the adoption of medical insurance.  Errors are
clustered by country.46
Table 8:  Explaining the Birth of Old Age Insurance Systems
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      N 20 20 20 20
      ln(Likelihood) -18.38 -21.14 -41.58 -34.9
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses.  Column 5 lists likelihood ratio statistics for a difference
between the coefficients in columns one and two. * Denotes a coefficient significant at the
10% level, ** a coefficient significant at the 5% level.47
Figure 1 State Pension Spending and the Proportion of Populations Aged 65 or
More, 1995.
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Figure 3 (a): Creation Dates of OAI and NHI Systems, and Industrialization in 1900.
Country names prefixed ￿M￿ show creations of Health Insurance Systems.
Figure 3 (b): Creation Dates of OAI and NHI Systems, and Urbanization in 1900.
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Percent of Population in Cities of 100,000 or More, 1900












































Figure 3 (c): Creation Dates of OAI and NHI Systems, and Ethno-Linguistic
Heterogeneity in 1960.  Country names prefixed ￿M￿ denote creations of
Health Insurance Systems.
Figure 3 (d): Creation Dates of OAI and NHI Systems, and Aged Population in
1900.
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Figure 3 (e): Creation Dates of OAI and NHI Systems, and GDP Per Capita in
1900.
Country names prefixed ￿M￿ denote creations of Health Insurance
Systems.
Figure 4 (a): Date and Type of OAI System Adopted, and GDP Per Capita in 1900

























1900 GDP Per Capita in 1985 Dollars




































































1900 GDP Per Capita in 1985 Dollars












































Figure 4 (b): Date and Type of OAI System Adopted and Catholic Belief in 1996
￿Ins￿ denotes an Insurance System, ￿Min￿ a Minimum system.
Figure 4(c): Date and Type of OAI System Adopted by Political Regime in 1900
￿Ins￿ denotes an Insurance System, ￿Min￿ a Minimum system.  The country names are
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